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“We must be fully aware of the severity and complexity 
of our country's environmental situation and the 
importance and urgency of increasing environmental 
protection. Protecting the environment is to protect the 
homes we live in and the foundations for the 
development of the Chinese nation. We should not 
use up resources left by our forefathers without 
leaving any to our offspring. China should be on high 
alert to fight against worsening environmental pollution 
and ecological deterioration in some regions, and 
environmental protection should be given a higher 
priority in the drive for national modernization.” 
 
Premier Wen Jia-bao,  
Address to the 6th National Conference on  
Environmental Protection, April 17, 2006  
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Executive Summary 
The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
Task Force on Environmental Governance assembled a group of environmental policy 
experts and academics from China, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United 
States to examine means for developing more effective environmental governance 
strategies for China. The Task Force surveyed the status of environmental governance 
in China and across East Asia, the European Union, Japan, and the United States to 
form the basis for the recommendations in this report. 
 
The Task Force was convened because China is facing unprecedented challenges in 
its efforts to protect the environment and natural resource base. The rapid deterioration 
of the nation’s environmental quality and depletion of its natural resources are 
threatening the lives and health of the largest population in the world and the very 
potential for sustained growth of the economy. In response, the Chinese government 
has recently elevated the importance of environment protection in its national 
development strategy. 
 
However, the Task Force believes that what is required is a more dramatic and 
comprehensive shift in approach to these problems. In essence, China must reform 
important elements in its approach to environmental governance. The challenges that 
China faces are no less vexing and important than the challenge of economic reform, 
the restructuring of the management of state owned enterprises (SOEs), and the 
challenge of effectively managing the state’s (and the people’s) financial assets that 
are so key to the economic aspirations of the nation. The environment and natural 
resources of China are no less critical assets of the nation, representing the patrimony 
of the people, and no less deserving of good governance.  
 
As development proceeds and more citizens are lifted from poverty, their attention 
naturally focuses on enjoying their new wealth, enjoyment that requires a healthy 
environment. The government has set a goal of achieving the Xiaokang Society by the 
year 2020. The common representation of this goal is primarily in terms of material 
wealth. However, material wealth without the good health to enjoy it is an unsatisfying 
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outcome. Therefore, the Task Force recommends that a set of measures and 
institutional innovations be adopted similar in scope to those for the reform of SOEs 
which will insure that the environmental and natural resource wealth of the nation will 
be preserved and enhanced to support the welfare of the people.   
 
In his April 2006 speech during the Sixth National Environmental Conference, Premier 
Wen Jia-bao emphasized the importance of three transitions, the transition (1) from a 
focus on economic growth to a focus on environment and economic development; (2) 
from environment as a lagging objective to equal importance with economic 
development; and (3) from the primary use of administrative methods of environmental 
management to a more comprehensive system combining many approaches.  
 
Some positive moves have been made in this direction. The government has begun to 
consider evaluating the performance of local government leaders on environmental 
performance rather than just focusing solely on economic growth categories. To aid 
this evaluation, there have been experiments with measuring Green GDP, of a number 
of cities and provinces in China. These are extremely interesting steps. However, if 
China is to embark on these transitions, significant institutional changes are necessary. 
The Task Force notes that to be successful the process of reform should be 
systematic and driven by the goal of improving environmental governance. As the 
experience of the economic reforms has shown, picking just one or two international 
experiences for adoption without consideration of a comprehensive plan of reform is 
not likely to achieve the goal. Specifically, the Task Force believes China would benefit 
greatly by strengthening its environmental governance in four major issue areas:  
(1) Improving the government’s capacity to enforce environmental laws and oversee 
the implementation of environmental programs, to enhance the government’s capacity 
to control environmental pollution, and to improve the management of natural 
resources;  
(2) Engaging the business sector to take a more proactive role in environmental 
management by providing incentives to those that perform well and punishing those 
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that do not, and by promoting best practices of industrial production and hazardous 
accident preparedness;  
(3) Engaging civil society by providing greater transparency of information concerning 
environmental and natural resource conditions and of government decision-making 
activities, combined with access and participation by stakeholders, NGOs, and the 
general public, and; 
(4) Establishing greater policy coherence and planning capacity for both domestic and 
international environmental and natural resource issues.   
To put China firmly on the path of the three transitions, the following action items are 
recommended by the Task Force on Environmental Governance in each of the four 
major issue areas: 
1. Government 
The first major challenge identified by the Task Force (TF) is the insufficient 
administrative authority and capacity accorded to the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) in policy planning, implementation, and coordination with 
related agencies. The second major challenge comes from a policy approach that 
tends to be reactive—responding to pollution problems once they occur, rather than 
proactive and preventive—working to limit the extent and range of pollution problems 
and natural resource destruction before they occur. The third major challenge is in 
relation to the development of multi-sector and public access and participation in 
policy-making, enforcement, monitoring, and evaluation. Accordingly, the Task Force 
on Environmental Governance makes the following recommendations. 
1.1 Executive Branch 
(1a) Elevate SEPA to full cabinet rank in the government.   
(1b) Establish a leading group on national environmental issues chaired by the 
Premier, with membership comprised of the Ministers of all relevant agencies 
and the Secretariat provided by SEPA. In order to further improve policy 
integration, establish environmental consultative groups within the research arm 
of the public service units of all ministries, administrations, and bureaus.   
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(1c) Reforming the institutional status of SEPA will place new burdens upon it to 
enhance the effectiveness of its policy, planning, and evaluation process. 
Especially, SEPA will need to develop internal mechanisms for coordination 
across departments to build more comprehensive policy regimes and integrated 
databases whose elements may require cooperation from several traditionally 
independent management responsibilities. Internal vetting of policy proposals 
will insure that the strongest possible initiatives emerge from SEPA’s internal 
process, and require that all policy proposals are evaluated for their 
environmental, economic, and social impacts. A mechanism for identifying new 
and emerging environmental threats also needs to be developed.   
(1d) Improve multi-level governance by realigning local environmental manage-
ment to create a direct line of authority to provincial EPBs. This can be done by 
giving provincial governments the power to appoint local environmental 
protection bureau directors and requiring provincial governments to provide the 
budget for local EPB operations. In addition, SEPA can enhance the perform-
ance of local management by providing financial support to those provinces in 
greatest need of resources, by charging the new regional SEPA offices with the 
responsibility to coordinate and guide local implementation efforts, and by 
establishing performance requirements for environmental outcomes reviewed for 
conformity by SEPA.   
(1e) Enhance the scientific basis of environmental management by developing 
science and technology capacity within SEPA to assess and manage major 
environmental issues across major pollutants and industrial sectors by providing 
SEPA with the authority to establish independent advisory commissions in 
particularly salient and complex issue areas. These commissions should have a 
legal status with requirements for membership to be drawn from government, 
business, and civil society. The work of these commissions should be 
documented in a publicly released report. SEPA should also be provided with the 
resources to support research in cooperating universities and research 
institutions to improve scientific and societal understanding of emerging 
environmental problems and aid in the development of practical solutions.   
(1f) Enhance the capacity of the environmental administrative system of China’s 
central government by increasing the budget and size of SEPA in order for it to 
adequately meet its responsibilities of analysis, monitoring, regulation, technical 
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and professional training, and enforcement. Provide funding, through SEPA 
grants, for the costs of demonstrating new innovative environmental 
management programs in cooperation with participating local environmental 
bureaus.   
1.2 Legislative Branch 
(1g) Strengthen the legal foundations of environmental management. Insure that 
all environmental policy tools have an appropriate legal basis. Remove the 
inconsistencies between environmental laws and the laws governing natural 
resources and energy.   
(1h) The National People’s Congress capacity to oversee the implementation of 
the nation’s environmental laws should be strengthened. The Committee on 
Environment and Natural Resources in particular should have a standing 
professional staff and budget to allow effective inquires and analysis to be 
conducted so as to inform the process of revising current laws and enacting new 
ones. The Provincial People’s Congresses and Municipal Assemblies also could 
have such committees.   
1.3 Judicial Branch 
(1i) Train judges and the procuracy in environmental problems and solutions to 
make them aware of the extensive damages to human health and the environ-
ment caused by various types of emissions. Equip them with knowledge of the 
tools and resources available to them in making decisions in complex 
environmental liability and compensation cases.   
2. Business 
The Task Force on Environmental Governance (TF) is of the opinion that the im-
mense power of the market to address environmental problems should be harnessed 
to create a resource efficient and environmentally friendly society. Furthermore, in 
view of the knowledge and capital accumulated in the non-public sector, every effort 
should be made to mobilize these resources to facilitate the smooth implementation 
of environmental management. Performance-based environmental responsibilities 
either required by the government or self-imposed by companies seeking to thrive in 
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the globally competitive economy will create additional space for innovation towards 
ecological modernization of China. Economic incentives can energize business and 
harmonize economic and environmental goals.   
(2a) Establish clear legally enforceable environmental responsibilities for enter-
prises and maximize compliance by insuring that the suite of government 
incentive programs targeted to business are environmentally coherent in the 
direction of creating an environmentally friendly society. Reinforce compliance 
by establishing penalties for non-compliance with environmental laws and regu-
lations that recapture any financial benefit from non-compliance. Use the penalty 
structure to create a deterrent to pollution. Strengthen civil penalties for pollution 
damage and criminal penalties for the most severe violations. Additionally, pro-
vide incentives for companies to improve environmental management, move 
towards cleaner technology and products, and thus go beyond mere 
compliance.   
(2b) Establish reporting requirements for data to assure comparability of data 
across facilities and over time. Provide funding for the establishment and main-
tenance of an internet-based reporting system, with source by source data 
publicly available to all stakeholders. Public access to and analysis of environ-
mental and natural resource data will enhance data quality and source 
accountability.   
 
(2c) Establish civil and criminal liability laws for damages caused by operators of 
facilities responsible for environmental pollution and accidents. Provide rigorous 
standard methodologies for the calculation of environmental damages.   
 
(2d) Require companies to report the presence of chemicals and other 
hazardous substances and establish emergency response plans and 
mechanisms with the requirement for timely reporting of any accidents.   
 
(2e) For the special case of the management of hazardous wastes and toxic 
substances, establish a Hazardous Substances Response Fund for clean up of 
emergency spills. This can be financed with a tax on companies using 
hazardous substances which, in turn, becomes an incentive to reduce their use.   
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(2f) Enhance corporate environmental responsibility by requiring the designation 
of a corporate officer as the individual legally responsible and accountable for 
environmental compliance. Encourage environmental audits and annual public 
environmental reporting commensurate with annual financial reports. SEPA 
should require the disclosure of environmental liabilities by Chinese companies 
prior to Initial Public Offerings.   
 
(2g) Develop public-private partnerships and dialogues among government, 
business, and non-governmental organizations to leverage the individual 
resources, perspectives, and capacities of these stakeholders to find commonly 
agreed solutions.   
3. Civil Society and Public Participation 
The complexity and quantity of the environmental issues confronting all nations today 
has overwhelmed the capacity of even the strongest and best prepared of 
governments, working alone. Most developed countries have, as a result, opened 
their societies to greater environmental NGO participation. They have removed many 
of the legal, political, and financial obstacles that existed to the full realization of the 
capacity of non-governmental groups. The Chinese government is responding and 
has become increasingly open to civil society participation in environmental 
decision-making and implementation. The Task Force on Environmental Governance 
is of the opinion that strengthening this reform through the following measures is 
necessary to achieve effective environmental governance. 
(3a) Enhance the legal status of citizens and NGOs, clarifying their rights in 
environmental controversies and providing them legal standing in the courts on 
behalf of injured parties and the environment.   
(3b) Conduct outreach and education of the public about the chances and 
opportunities to participate in environmental decision-making.   
(3c) Establish public advisory bodies convened around specific issues for the 
purpose of broadening government consultation with civil society.   
(3d) Improve public access to environmental information concerning emissions 
and their consequences in order to empower meaningful public participation. 
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Widely publish advance notice of proposed regulations or permit proceedings for 
industrial and natural resource projects to facilitate public participation.   
(3e) Mitigate any barriers limiting citizen and NGO participation by streamlining 
the procedures for NGO registration, appointing NGO representatives to 
advisory boards and commissions, and educating non-governmental groups 
about the government’s perspectives and processes to enable participation.   
(3f) Enhance NGO capacity by clarifying the regulations concerning the 
qualifications necessary to achieve tax advantaged status.   
4. International Cooperation 
The Task Force has concentrated its focus on the domestic elements of environ-
mental governance. However, increasingly the serious environmental problems we 
face are beyond the scope of any one individual nation. Global environmental threats 
such as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, biodiversity loss, cycling of 
persistent organic pollutants, water shortage, and soils degradation require coordi-
nated international action for their solution. The Task Force recognizes that effective 
international action is dependent upon sovereign willingness and capacity to act 
effectively and that individual sovereigns may be constrained in their commitments by 
this capacity. The recommendations on improving environmental governance - if 
adopted - will however enhance this capacity. China’s rise in the global economy has 
made the nation vital to the international efforts to conserve the global ecology.   
 
(4a) As part of the on-going regional free trade negotiations, China should 
propose to other nations in the region the establishment of an environmental 
commission to promote a comprehensive regional approach to the protection, 
improvement, and sustainable management of its natural resources. This 
commission should include mechanisms for environmental dispute resolution 
and participation by civil society from the participating nations.   
 
(4b) China should prepare for playing a more active role in the implementation 
and further development of ratified international environmental conventions and 
multilateral environmental agreements, especially on climate, biodiversity, 
desertification, persistent organic pollutants, water and forests, in order to insure 
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that the mutually agreed goals of such agreements are met and fortified. 
Especially, the instrumental basis of such agreements needs to be enlarged in 
order to balance economic and environmental interests and to make win-win 
situations possible.   
 
(4c) Enhance the effectiveness of China’s environmental diplomacy and 
participation in global environmental governance by strengthening the environ-
mental training of China’s diplomatic corps.   
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Report 
of the Task Force on Environmental Governance in China 
1. Background 
The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
Task Force on Environmental Governance (henceforth, TF) assembled a group of 
environmental policy experts, academics, from China, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Japan, and the United States to examine means for developing more effective envi-
ronmental governance strategies for China. Environmental governance refers to the 
formal and informal institutional mechanisms used by a society to address pollution 
problems, promote pollution control and prevention, conserve nature, and manage the 
use of natural resources.   
 
Whereas the term “government” focuses attention on governmental bodies and actors, 
the word “governance” points to the processes used to control or coordinate social or 
economic activities, achieve societal goals and deal with policy problems. Environ-
mental governance thus is usually understood to include not only the kinds of 
top-down mechanisms frequently used by governments to regulate behavior that 
affects the environment, but also other non-regulatory approaches, such as voluntary 
mechanisms or educational tools, that can be used to improve environmental 
conditions. Environmental governance, moreover, addresses the relationships that 
governments have with market actors, civil society, and the scientific community.   
 
The TF surveyed the status of environmental governance in China through case 
studies on biodiversity protection, climate policy, sulfur dioxide emissions, the urban 
environment, solid waste management, sand storms and desertification, the role of 
non-governmental organizations, the Songhua River benzene accident, and 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. In addition, the TF examined 
environmental governance approaches across East Asia, the European Union, Japan, 
and the United States and in relation to specific experiences in urban air pollution, 
environmental disaster response and prevention, and renewable energies. These 
case studies became the basis for the recommendations of the TF for how China 
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could work to strengthen environmental governance so that it might achieve more 
effective environmental outcomes.   
 
China is facing unprecedented challenges in its efforts to protect the environment and 
natural resource base (see Qi, Su & Chen: “China’s Biodiversity Governance”, Case 
Study). The rapid deterioration of the nation’s environmental quality and depletion of 
its natural resources are threatening the lives and health of the largest population in 
the world and the very potential for sustained growth of the economy. One out of every 
five cities in the country suffers from serious air pollution resulting in more than 
400,000 premature deaths per year; about two thirds of all cities experience shortage 
of drinking water; one third of the land area is affected by acid rain; one third of land 
suffers from soil erosion and desertification; more than 90% of natural grasslands are 
degraded; overall biodiversity is threatened and environmental disputes and protests 
are rising (see on this the various Case Studies cited).  
 
On September 7, 2006 SEPA released its first report on China’s “Green National 
Economy”, also called “green GDP”, calculated by subtracting the cost of natural 
resources used and environmental degradation from the GDP. According to this 
methodology, environmental pollution cost China 511.8 billion yuan (approx. 64 billion 
U.S. dollars) in economic losses in 2004, accounting for 3.05 % of the GDP. The 
report also exposed a huge shortfall in environmental protection investment. It said 
China would need 1.08 trillion yuan (approx. 135 billion U.S. dollars) to clean up all the 
industrial pollutants and household wastes produced. But the actual investment was 
only 190 billion yuan (or 24 billion U.S. dollars). 
 
Based on a newly developed Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking of 133 
nations on 16 indicators of environmental quality and policy performance, China 
ranked 94th, below all the developed and many of the developing nations of the world 
(see Center for Environmental Law at Yale University and CIESIN: Environmental 
Performance Index, 2006). Moreover, not only is China currently the second largest 
greenhouse gas emitter in the world after the United States, projections are that due to 
a number of geographical, social, and climatic conditions, China will be hit by climate 
change much harder than many other countries (see Qi & Ma: “Towards a Proactive 
 22
Climate Policy”, Case Study). These and other threats call for urgent action and 
effective environmental governance.   
 
The Chinese government has recently elevated the importance of environment 
protection in its national development strategy. Environmental protection is critical for 
implementation of the scientific development concept, for achieving a Xiaokang 
society, as a test of how well the government is serving the people and building its 
capabilities, and for ensuring the construction of an environmentally harmonious 
society. Key ingredients of this goal are:  
• protection of citizens’ health  
• enhancement of national environmental and resource patrimony 
 
The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) set clear goals related to environmental protection. 
These include promotion of energy efficiency, pollution control and resource conser-
vation so as to be able to cut energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% and major 
pollutants by 10%, relative to 2005 levels by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan, and to 
increase forest coverage to 20% of the country from its 2005 level of 18.2%. 
Profoundly, the achievement of these targets will be taken as indicators to evaluate 
the performance of governments at various levels.   
 
Increasingly China is no longer a country in transition to a market economy. Arguably 
it has arrived. With it comes the need to transform environmental institutions that have 
responded relatively slowly to the extraordinarily rapid changes in the economy at 
large. This mis-match in the speed of change and response is a significant source of 
many of China’s environmental problems. Reforming environmental governance 
therefore is a top priority if China is to succeed in achieving its environmental goals. 
This reform includes the rationalization of government management, the 
strengthening of the legal foundations, a greater reliance on market-based policies, 
and the constructive engagement of business and of civil society. Furthermore, a 
systematic review of past experiences with existing policy mechanisms and responses 
to problems should be undertaken to learn what has worked, what has not and why.   
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Achieving the country’s national development goals while enhancing environmental 
quality and improving protection of natural resources, will require effective 
environmental governance. Effective environmental governance is characterized by a 
pro-active, learning and self-correcting system where the government has the 
capacity to enforce environmental policy; where systematic use is made of scientific 
based reporting, monitoring and decision making; where adoption of best available 
practices by business and industry, including preventative, not simply reactive policy 
measures is promoted; where multi-sector and citizen access and participation in 
environmental protection is encouraged; where strategic and comprehensive efforts 
are made to harmonize the environmental and the economic policies of the entire 
nation, and where innovative leadership is supported.   
 
Measured by these standards, the TF has found some serious challenges in 
environmental governance in China. These findings confirm and complement those of 
other researchers and recently published studies, including the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD: “Governance in China”, 2005) and 
the State Council’s “White Paper on Environmental Protection in China, 1996-2005” 
(2006).   
 
2. Challenges 
2.1 Government Capacity 
The first major challenge identified by the TF is the insufficient administrative authority 
and capacity accorded to the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
in policy planning, implementation, and coordination with related agencies. The 
Environmental Protection Law of China provides that SEPA be the lead agency for 
environmental protection for the nation. Given China’s vast size, large population, and 
tremendous environmental needs, this means that SEPA has been given immense 
responsibilities. Yet, in sharp contrast with the expectations placed on SEPA as the 
lead government agency in charge of assuring the health of the nation’s environment, 
SEPA’s capacity to improve environmental conditions is severely limited, due to 
insufficient staff and resources and communication among environmental agencies. In 
essence, its administrative capacity is exceedingly weak.  
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The fact that SEPA lacks full cabinet status in the government makes it difficult for 
SEPA to participate in critical environmental decision-making involving policy planning, 
coordination with other ministries and agencies, the setting of national environmental 
priorities, and in resolving environmental disputes. SEPA has been mandated to 
develop and implement environmental policies, but it has not been given adequate 
policy tools, capacity or political strength to fulfill this expectation. SEPA cannot 
succeed in protecting the nation’s environment without the collaboration of other 
government bodies, as many environmental responsibilities are shared across 
agencies and levels of government. Instead of cooperating to promote good 
environmental outcomes, different governmental bodies tend to compete with each 
other for limited resources and influence. Thus, SEPA often finds itself in conflict with 
the priorities of other institutions, but lacks adequate capacity to address this problem.  
 
Environmental considerations, moreover, are not adequately incorporated into the 
expectations of performance of other government ministries and agencies. In order to 
fulfill Premier Wen Jia-bao’s stated objective of elevating the status of environmental 
protection to a level equal in importance to economic growth, environmental goals will 
have to be given greater weight in the performance evaluations of the economic, 
transportation, financial and other ministries and agencies as well. This is what is 
basically meant by the term policy integration.   
 
There are other problems of environmental governance in a multi-level system. 
Environmental administration at the local level is susceptible to interference by local 
leaders due to the relationships between the vertical and horizontal lines (tiaokuai 
guanxi) of government. Lower level Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) 
formally report to higher level EPBs (and ultimately to SEPA), but the funding and 
supervisory functions are provided by the provincial or lower level administration. The 
lack of sufficient financial resources for environmental administrations at the local 
level (and occasionally at the national level) to perform their required tasks is creating 
perverse incentives with deleterious environmental impacts. Many EPBs have be-
come dependent on the pollution levies they collect, which yield substantial revenues 
and are used to cover their operating costs. This means indirectly, that EPBs have an 
incentive to allow industries to pollute so that they can collect pollution fees.  
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In the United States, permit fees are levied per ton of allowable discharge, but the 
permit fees are quite low and the objective is to provide funds for the operation of the 
permit program rather than as a primary tool of environmental policy. In China, in 
contrast, the pollution levy system has served as the government’s primary policy tool 
but with limited effectiveness.   
 
Given that effective environmental protection requires familiarity with local conditions, 
good environmental governance requires that flexibility be built into the system that 
can accommodate geographic and economic differences. Local and provincial gov-
ernments are key stakeholders in environmental management and need to be 
included in decision-making. The new government responsibility system for environ-
mental performance is one means of promoting local governmental involvement in 
meeting environmental performance goals. Mechanisms to reward good performers, 
to encourage better performance among moderate performers, and to punish those 
who flout the system are necessary. It will also be necessary to make explicit what is 
expected of local governments in terms of minimum program elements and perform-
ance criteria. Incentive structures to promote sustainable development at the local 
level should be strengthened. Finally, the central government should have a means in 
place to step in cases where local performance is inadequate or efforts to incorporate 
environmental considerations in local outcomes are non-existent.   
 
2.2 Reactive, Unintegrated, and Uncoordinated Policies 
The second major challenge comes from a policy approach that tends to be 
reactive—responding to pollution problems once they occur, rather than proactive and 
preventive—working to limit the extent and range of pollution problems and natural 
resource destruction before they occur. Many avoidable environmental problems 
occur because of the failure of government and industry to adopt best practices in the 
first place. Policies such as the three simultaneous and the EIA are designed to 
address this problem, but they have systematic defects: 
• lack of feedback and review 
• lack of an effective non-compliance penalty 
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The penalty and liability structure if set as a pollution deterrent can cause firms to 
focus on the elimination of pollution rather than its treatment and disposal. Strict 
liability rules for the damages resulting from either pollution or accidental discharge 
will put firms on notice that ineffective environmental management will be dangerous 
to their financial health, if not survival. Under these rules, firms will avoid pollution and 
its financial consequences in the first place.   
 
There is also a lack of capacity for dealing with problems when they arise. The 
pollution of the Songhua River by a large benzene spill in November, 2005 is a case in 
point (see Mao, Li & Li:”Analysis of the Songhuajiang Crisis”, Case Study). The siting 
and permitting of potentially dangerous industrial facilities did not require the 
development of emergency response plans in the event of industrial accidents 
involving harzardous or toxic chemical spills. For other environmental problems 
involving transboundary pollution such as the persistent pollution of the Huaihe River, 
neither the capacity nor the tools to manage regionally are robust. Traveling across 
many jurisdictions, this type of pollution poses a severe challenge to the fundamental 
law on environmental management which establishes the primacy of local control. The 
annual spring sandstorms are another example of both a cross-sectoral and 
transboundary environmental problem (see Hu, Zhang & Sun: “Analysis of the Root 
Causes of Sandstorms in China”, Case Study). To the extent that economic 
development planning can move toward realization of a “circular economy”, this 
should have positive environmental benefits. Better integration of environmental and 
development policies and plans with the market is imperative for achieving the 
Chinese government’s goal of sustainable development. The breakneck growth of 
coal-fired electric generating plants without a comprehensive evaluation of alternative 
means to expand electricity supply, or the financial necessity for such investments, or 
the full environmental consequences of these investments is a case in point.   
 
However, even with the best of planning and preventive action, accidents will still 
occur and emergency situations may arise, as with the explosions at the 101 
Petrochemical Plant in Jilin that spilled an estimated 100 tons of benzene and 
nitrobenzene into the Songhua River, one of the worst chemical accidents in China’s 
history. If such environmental emergencies cannot be completely prevented, they at 
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least require prompt and effective responses (see Percival & Schreurs: “Environ-
mental Crisis Management – A Comparative Analysis”, Occasional Paper). 
Emergency policies and plans, appropriate legal and technical infrastructure, and 
accident reporting and response mechanisms must be established to reduce 
environmental risks and harms to society. Numerous incidents that have occurred 
throughout the country—such as a cadmium spill in the Beijiang River in Guandong 
Province, chemical spills in the Hunjiang River and the Xiangjiang River, and an oil 
spill in Ganjiang River—reveal a nationwide lack of adequate emergency response 
systems and mechanisms. These accidents are also very costly. In 2005, environ-
mental accidents cost an estimated 105 million yuan (approx. U.S.$13.125 million) 
(http://english.sina.com/china/1/2006/0419/73271.html). 
 
2.3 Capacity outside the Government 
The third major challenge is in relation to the development of multi-sector and public 
access and participation in policy making and enforcement. In the past, the govern-
ment has assumed primary responsibility for environmental protection in China in a 
top-down regulatory fashion. However, in March of 2005, in his report of the work of 
the government to the National People’s Congress, Premier Wen Jia-bao recognized 
that the government cannot be responsible for solving all problems that society faces. 
He urged other groups in society including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
become actively involved. Harnessing the energies and capacities of civil society to be 
more actively engaged in developing solutions for environmental problems will 
enhance the prospects of actually building an environmentally harmonious society. 
 
The experiences and lessons from, Europe, Japan and the United States suggest that 
environmental goals can not be achieved unless all sectors in the 
society—government, business, NGOs, and the general public—are involved. 
Environmental protection is a shared responsibility, and effective environmental 
governance requires that the perspectives, experiences, and abilities of different 
actors be incorporated in planning and implementation decisions and actions. Public 
participation by all stakeholders should be a guiding principle in the making of all 
future environmental polices and laws.   
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In recent years, the Chinese government has exhibited its determination to address 
the country’s severe pollution problems. The central government has shown 
considerable leadership with its formulation of environmental laws and programs. 
Nevertheless, many problems still remain. Achieving sustainable development will 
require leadership at all levels of government and society and by all people in the 
country.   
In view of these serious challenges, the TF believes China will benefit greatly from 
strengthening its environmental governance. Based on our own case studies and 
deliberations, and building on the findings of other academic and professional bodies 
which have also examined environmental governance issues in China, it is the TF’s 
recommendation that significant and specific action be taken in the following four 
issue areas: 
I.  Improve the Government’s Capacity to Enforce Environmental Laws 
and Oversee the Implementation of Environmental Programs 
II. Adopt Best and Safe Practice in Business and Industry 
III. Enhance Stakeholder and Citizen Participation 
IV. Establish Multi-Sector Coherence and Foresight and Improve  
International Environmental Cooperation 
Some details on these four issue areas and the respective action items shall be given 
in the following. 
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3. Task Force Recommendations 
3.1 Improve Government’s Capacity to Enforce Environmental Laws and 
Regulations 
Many of the kinds of pollution and natural resource issues facing China today were 
experienced in Japan, the United States, and Europe in earlier decades and some of 
the same problems remain today. The significant improvement in the control of 
environmental pollution over the past half century and the current focus on 
environmentally friendly enterprise among OECD nations is the result of public 
awareness and expectations, scientific advancement, societal learning, and strong 
governmental leadership in moving societies in this direction. In Japan and the West, 
substantial capacity now exists in the internal management of environmental agencies. 
Many steps have been taken to assure systematic monitoring, oversight, enforcement, 
and continuous scientific data collection and analysis. As a result, substantial 
improvements have been made in energy and resource efficiency levels and pollution 
control. These changes have not been achieved easily or always in the most efficient 
manner, yet they have been accomplished without undermining the economic growth 
and the quality of life enjoyed by the affected populations. In fact, these changes were 
necessary to protect the health of citizens and to reverse dangerous levels of resource 
degradation. Indeed, these changes have in many cases done much to improve 
quality of life and even the economic performance of firms.  
Improving environmental governance in the European Union, Japan, and the United 
States has required the adoption of stringent environmental protection legislation, 
substantial policy experimentation and learning, development of the administrative 
and managerial capacity within governments and businesses to carry out the 
provisions of environmental laws, the allocation of substantial public and private 
resources, and unrelenting pressure from the general public and involvement of the 
NGO community. In every instance of sustained environmental improvement it has 
required the expectation in the society that there will be strong enforcement of 
environmental policy and leadership from the nation’s top government officials and 
central environmental agencies (see Gade & Faur: “The United States Environmental 
Policy System – An Evolution in Federal vs. Local Control”, Occasional Paper).  
China has made enormous strides in this regard since the establishment of the Lead 
Group of Environmental Protection under the State Council in 1974 and the National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) in 1984. The elevation of NEPA to the State 
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Environmental Protection Administration in 1998 was a particularly important 
development. And while SEPA only has a few hundred officials working directly for it, 
there are also thousands of village, county, municipal, and provincial level EPBs to 
assess, monitor, and protect the environment and natural resources of the nation. 
Nonetheless, as indicated by the TF’s case studies and in the numerous academic 
and research reports by Chinese and international scholars, the pace of economic, 
industrial, and urban development in China and the resultant environmental 
degradation to water, air, land and human health, has outpaced the ability of SEPA 
and the EPBs to provide the level of environmental protection intended in the nation’s 
laws and expected by the leaders and the people of China.   
It is the opinion of the TF that this imbalance needs to be redressed as the single most 
important step in improving the environment, health, and quality of life in China, while 
the nation continues to develop economically. The situation calls for significantly 
enhancing the capacity and role of SEPA and its counterpart EPBs to ensure the 
successful realization of the ambitious environmental goals of the law and of the 11th 
Five Year plan; goals and laws cogently summarized and restated in the State 
Council’s recently published “White Paper on Environmental Protection in China, 
1996-2005”.  
To create the needed administrative and managerial capacity within the government 
commensurate with the multi-faceted challenges of environmental protection in China, 
the TF recommends the following actions be taken by the central government. 
a. Elevating SEPA 
SEPA lacks the stature and power of other government ministries. It does not have 
capacity commensurate with its responsibility to implement the law and protect the 
environment. A major step in remedying this situation is to elevate SEPA to cabinet 
rank.  
The experience in nations as diverse as Japan, Germany, and the United States all 
substantiate the need to elevate a nation’s environmental agency to the highest level 
of government in order to imbue it with the power, prestige, and visibility necessary to 
serve as a counter-weight to the competing forces in the government, and in society. 
In 1971, the Netherlands added environmental protection to the responsibilities of the 
Ministry of Public Health and Environment; in 1982, environmental protection was 
 31
moved to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. In the wake 
of the Chernobyl nuclear accident and rising concerns about acid rain and 
stratospheric ozone depletion, in 1986, the German federal government combined the 
environmental responsibilities that had been held by three separate ministries (interior, 
agriculture, and health) into the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature 
Conservation, and Nuclear Safety. When in 2001 the Japanese government 
restructured its government and cut the number of ministries in half, it created only 
one new ministry: the Environment Ministry. The United States has not created a 
Department of the Environment, but the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Administrator is accorded Cabinet rank and reports directly to the President. Providing 
SEPA with this level of standing within the government is important in light of the 
expectation that development and resource consumption in China must be 
harmonized with environmental protection and resource conservation in order to 
ensure a more sustainable society. Elevating SEPA will also provide it greater access 
and accountability to the nation’s senior political leadership.  
Action item (1): Elevate SEPA to full cabinet rank in the government.  
b. Streamlining EPBs and Aligning them with SEPA 
Coordinating and aligning the disparate interests at the local, regional, and national 
level of society around environmental policy objectives and the management of 
natural resources has been one of the more difficult challenges faced by every OECD 
nation that has developed the capacity to oversee management of its resources and 
addressed the serious problems of pollution that accompanied industrialization. The 
experiences of the nations of the EU, Japan, and the United States suggest that there 
is no single best solution to the challenge of reconciling and balancing local and 
regional needs and conditions with national goals. The federalized systems of 
environmental protection with the European Union, the United States, and Germany 
all operate on different models. The critical consideration for effective coordination 
among units in a federal system is that the sub-national administrative units that are 
responsible for the implementation of national law and policy have environmental 
protection as a very high priority.  
The sub-national units are usually provided with the flexibility to adjust for regional 
variations, and in some instances with the ability to develop regulations more stringent 
than those promulgated nationally. An example of the latter can be found in the TF 
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case study of clean air policy in Los Angeles, where a critical factor in the success in 
cleaning the air was due to the ability of the State of California to impose clean air 
standards that exceed those established by the Environmental Protection Agency of 
the United States (see Mazmanian: ”Achieving Air Quality – The Los Angeles 
Experience,” Occasional Paper). The European Union operates on the basis of 
subsidiarity, meaning that environmental protection should occur at the lowest 
governmental level appropriate to the issue. Local environmental problems, thus, are 
the responsibility of local authorities. In contrast, environmental matters that are of 
transnational scope or impact typically are the responsibility of the European Union. 
The European Union, through qualified majority voting, establishes EU-wide 
environmental regulations and directives that member states must then transcribe into 
domestic law. EU directives usually leave member states quite some freedom to 
adapt goals and requirements to their specific situation. As is the case with California 
in the United States, individual member states of the EU do have the authority to 
establish environmental regulations that are more stringent than those established by 
the EU commission in Brussels as long as it can be shown that this is being done for 
environmental reasons (and not simply to obtain competitive advantage). 
Establishing the appropriate balance between national goals and local-regional goals 
and interests has required relinquishing of some regional autonomy in pursuit of 
national environmental goals, which has necessitated greater communication, the 
development of trust, and coordination among the national, regional and local levels of 
government. The improved inter-governmental relations has also helped in 
addressing cross-jurisdictional environmental problems at the sub-national level, such 
as managing at the watershed or air basin, or metropolitan level of a problem. In effect, 
in establishing a relatively few but connected levels of environmental agencies in 
Japan and the West, a balance has been struck that ensures a reasonably uniform 
implementation of national laws and regulations, provides for systematic performance 
evaluation based on national goals, while remaining fairly responsive to local needs 
and special circumstances. Moreover, the greater the integration and coordination 
among national and sub-national levels, the greater is the information sharing and 
policy learning possible throughout the entire system of environmental governance.  
China, with its more than 2,500 different environmental units at the county, municipal, 
provincial, and state level, has encountered extraordinary problems in inter-unit 
coordination and cooperation. This stems in part from the varying local interests and 
critical economic development pressures bearing upon the tens of thousands of actors 
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involved. It is the result of the unusual degree to which responsibility for environmental 
protection and enforcement has been devolved to the lowest levels of government in 
China. This problem in organization has been exacerbated by the far higher priority 
given to economic growth over environmental and resource protection until quite 
recently. The consequence, repeatedly cited in the scientific literature (see Literature 
and TF Occasional Papers, and Case Studies) and experienced by those responsible 
for environmental protection at the higher levels in China is that the sheer number of 
administrative units, their relatively weak capacity, their accountability primarily to the 
local government and appointed officials, and economic over environmental priorities 
has seriously undermined the goal of harmonious environmental-economic 
development.  
Finally, many if not most EPBs lack the resources to develop the scientific, technical, 
and managerial capacity needed to effectively carry out their mission, especially in the 
rapidly growing and complex urban settings of China (see Hu, Zhang, Zhang & Qin: 
“Urban Environmental Governance in China,” Case Study). The exception to the 
general pattern is the coordination and leadership found in a small number of major 
metropolitan centers, such as in Dalian, Nantong, Shanghai and Xiamen (OECD, 
op.cit.,p. 20), or in the plans for new eco-communities, such as Dongtan on the island 
of Chongming, and generally at the provincial level where the resources, capacity, 
and leadership in harmonious development exists. In these cases, the talents and 
resources have continued to grow and expand to better match the scale of their 
environmental problems. 
There is no fixed or simple organizational solution to matching environmental 
agencies to the size and scale of the problems they confront, but it is clear that China 
represents an extreme mis-match with its thousands of local EPBs struggling to 
address problems that are often of a transboundary or regional nature. It is the 
judgment of the TF that this must be rectified if China is to successfully address its 
pollution and resource protection needs and meet its ambitious goals in the 11th 
five-year plan. In considering various options, the TF believes that as a minimum, 
EPBs should be consolidated at the metropolitan level for all major urban centers 
throughout the nation. A second order of consolidation could occur at the provincial 
level. In addition, the funding for the provincial and metropolitan EPBs should be 
shared by the provinces, metro areas, and the central government. This is to ensure 
shared inter-governmental responsibility, coordination, and monitoring on the one 
hand, and fidelity to national environmental goals on the other. For these same 
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reasons, professional and managerial training for environmental management and the 
career development of those within these agencies should be a joint-responsibility, 
though primarily directed by SEPA.  
The intent of this recommendation is to provide a corrective to the serious 
fragmentation of environmental policy units in China today, along the lines developed 
over decades of experimentation in the OECD nations as they moved into the more 
advanced stages of economic development and environmental harmonization. 
Action item (2): Align the vast array of local EPBs around a three-tired system of 
national, provincial, and metropolitan (large urban) level environmental agencies, 
responsible to and reporting up through SEPA as the nation’s environment 
ministry. 
c. Providing Multi-Sector Oversight Capacity within SEPA 
The range and severity of China’s environmental problems has lead to the expectation 
that SEPA should and will enhance its regulatory reach across numerous industrial 
sectors, a growing number of large and small firms, and out to China’s many regions 
and communities. To accomplish this, however, will require the addition of scientific, 
technical, and managerial capacity. At the same time, and as a note of caution, the 
experience elsewhere has shown the perceived need for capacity can seem endless. 
While the resources and capacity of national environmental ministries varies across 
the OECD countries, by almost any measure the resources and capacity of SEPA are 
insufficient. This is the case whether measured by the number of personnel relative to 
population size, by per capita expenditure, per regulated unit of industry or industrial 
unit per expenditure, or in relation to funding for development ministries. 
Moreover, it has been the experience of national environmental agencies elsewhere, 
that even those with considerable internal capacity, in a number of important areas 
require additional specialized knowledge; in these cases, they have found it 
necessary to convene independent assessment and advisory bodies to the agency. 
Examples include the regular establishment of study groups on specific environmental 
problems by governmental agencies in Japan; the creation of Enquete Commissions 
of the federal parliament in Germany, made up of politicians, scientists, industry 
representatives and NGOs that address specific environmental issues, and the 
regular contracting out of research questions to environmental think tanks and 
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universities in the United States. It is the recommendation of the Task Force that 
SEPA should be provided the authority and resources to convene such bodies. 
Action item (3): Develop science and technology capacity within SEPA to 
assess and manage major environmental issues across major pollutants and 
industrial sectors. Provide SEPA with the authority to establish independent 
advisory commissions in particularly salient and complex issue areas. 
d. Providing Resources commensurate with SEPA’s Responsibilities 
It has been the experience elsewhere that when making the above recommended 
types of changes—such as streamlining through consolidating smaller governmental 
agencies, improving coordination across levels of government, enhancing data 
gathering, improving agency management, and establishing clear performance 
expectations—can produce budgetary savings. However, the savings are not always 
reflected in the central government’s budget allocation to the national environmental 
agency. The costs are usually captured by private sector actors seeking guidance, 
technical assistance, and permits from the agency, and the local governments that no 
longer are expected to totally fund and operate their own environmental agency. 
The scope and scale of the environmental problems facing China are enormous. Yet, 
the personnel and resources provided to SEPA are relatively small compared with the 
country’s geographical size, population, and environmental problems. SEPA has only 
on the order of 2,200 employees (219 administrative staff in its Beijing headquarters 
and about 2000 staff working in various national offices and centers affiliated with 
SEPA). Even if SEPA moves forward with its plans to establish six regional offices and 
hire another 180 employees, the manpower of the administration is comparatively 
rather weak. 
As points of comparison, the U.S. EPA employs 18,000 people in its Washington, D.C. 
headquarters, 10 regional offices (located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, 
Chicago, Dallas, Kansas City, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle), and more than a 
dozen laboratories (including the National Risk Management Research Laboratory of 
the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Division in Research Triangle Park, North 
Carolina and the National Enforcement Investigations Center Laboratory in Denver, 
Colorado). The German Federal Environment Ministry (BMU) has 830 employees in 
its principle offices in Bonn and Berlin and another 1,880 in its three affiliated federal 
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agencies: the Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt), the Federal Agency 
for Nature Conservation (Bundesamt für Naturschutz), and the Federal Office for 
Radiation Protection (Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz). In addition, the 16 German 
Länder have their own environmental administrations as the German Basic Law gives 
the Länder primary responsibility related to policy implementation. The Japanese 
Environment Ministry employs over 1,100 staff in its Kasumigaseki headquarters and 
several hundred more in its affiliated research centers and institutes (such as the 
National Institute for Environmental Studies, which employs approximately 270 
scientists). The Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment is 
staffed with more than 1,000 environmental policy personnel for a country of only 16.5 
million people. 
Action item (4): Enhance the capacity of the environmental administrative 
system of China’s central government by increasing the budget and size of 
SEPA in order for it to adequately meet its responsibilities of analysis, monitoring, 
regulation, technical and professional training, and enforcement. Provide, 
through SEPA grants, for a significant portion of the costs of operating 
metropolitan and provincial level EPBs. Establish a grant program to fund 
innovative environmental management experiments by local governments. 
Action item (5): Rationalize the internal management and organization of SEPA 
to enhance the development of integrated and comprehensive environmental 
policy tools. Establish an office responsible for policy integration reporting 
directly to the Minister and whose approval must be secured prior to any policy 
promulgation. 
3.2 Adopt Best and Safe Practice in Business and Industry  
a. Fostering Best Practice of Environmental Performance in Industry 
In Japan and the West there have been major movements towards more 
environmentally-friendly production processes. Examples include the European 
Union’s packaging waste and recycling directives, which create strong incentives for 
manufacturers to reduce packaging and product waste by requiring them to take back 
waste packaging and consumer products (including electronics and automobiles); 
movements in Europe to promote ecological modernization; and Japanese efforts to 
promote a cyclical-based economic structure.  
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In recent years, China’s leaders have expressed clear interest in promoting 
sustainable development (a circular economy) and renewable energy, as spelled out 
most recently in China’s 11th Five Year plan and the passage of the renewable energy 
law. The challenge for China now is to find appropriate environmental governance 
mechanisms to help ensure the successful implementation of these goals.  
To the extent that governments promote environment-friendly economic structures 
that reduce demands on resources and produce fewer emissions, waste problems 
can drastically be reduced (see Hu, Wu & Zhang: “Analysis of China’s Solid Waste 
Management”, Case Study). In 2005, China became the world’s second largest 
economy when measured in terms of purchasing power parity. Although the 
“ecological footprint” of the average Chinese is less than one-sixth that of the average 
individual living in the United States, China’s growth rates have been averaging close 
to 9% a year for much of the last decade. Assuming continued strong economic 
growth in the coming decade, China’s already severe pollution problems will reach 
crisis levels if strong measures are not taken to reduce harmful emissions and waste 
and promote renewable and clean energies.  
To address this difficult reality, the government should harness the immense power of 
the market to address environmental problems and promote an eco-friendly economy. 
Furthermore, in view of the knowledge and capital accumulated in the non-public 
sector, every effort should be made to mobilize this to facilitate the smooth 
implementation of environmental policy. 
Action item (6): Provide incentives for companies to move towards cleaner 
production systems (e.g. for companies that undergo ISO 14,001 certification), 
promote front-runner green products, technologies and businesses, or those that 
take back products from consumers for recycling. 
b. Adopting Preventative Measures 
China has been plagued by serious pollution problems and environmental crises. 
While it is important for societies to have measures in place to deal with accidents 
when they do occur, it is equally important that they set up systems for the prevention 
of such accidents. In the long-run, governments benefit if they require industries to 
pursue preventative measures that can help to avoid major accidents. In doing so, 
governments protect their citizens and their natural resources, limit costly legal and 
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societal battles, and win societal trust. Also, as China moves into the production of 
more and more products, the use of hazardous substances is increasing. This 
produces both threats to human health and the environment. It also creates the 
potential for major accidents, as occurred with the November 2005 Songhua River 
benzene spill (see Mao, Li & Li: “Analysis of the Songhuajiang Crisis”, Case Study). 
The key to prevention is strict liability for damages, strong enforcement with 
financially significant penalties, and rigorous facility permitting and siting procedures. 
 
One of the common lessons from environmental crises experienced in Japan, the 
United States and Europe is that information disclosure to the public is an important 
tool to facilitate emergency preparedness and community involvement in reducing risk. 
Information disclosure is the building block of effective science-based environmental 
decision making. One of the most effective and inexpensive tools for reducing the 
chance of environmental problems and disasters is to require companies to report the 
release to the environment of hazardous substances.  
 
One of the best known examples is the United States’ Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), 
a compilation of annual reports of the releases of toxic chemicals from facilities made 
available to the public. This information can be used by any individual to learn about 
the chemicals in his/her neighborhood (www.scorecard.org). This information has 
been used by communities to press companies to reduce their emissions. Many 
companies have voluntarily reduced their use of chemicals due to this disclosure 
requirement. Also, the U.S. Community Planning and Right to Know Act of 1986 
requires companies to notify authorities of the presence of extremely hazardous 
substances in excess of certain quantities (see Percival & Schreurs: ”Environmental 
Crisis Management – A Comparative Analysis”, Occasional Paper). 
 
Following the U.S. example, the Japanese Diet introduced the Chemical Substance 
Releases Reporting and Management Promotion Law in July 1999, established a 
reporting system for the release and transfer of chemical substances (known as the 
PRTR system). Businesses are required to report on their release to the environment 
of 354 specific chemical substances (Class 1 Designated Chemical Substances) and 
their transfer as a form of waste. This information is made public on the website of the 
Ministry of the Environment. 
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Similarly, the European Union’s Seveso II Directive applies to thousands of industrial 
facilities where dangerous substances are present in quantities that exceed the 
thresholds set in the directive. All facilities that fall under the scope of the directive 
must send notification to the competent authority regarding the chemicals on their site 
and must establish a Major-Accident Prevention Policy. Those with large quantities of 
designated chemicals must also establish a Safety Report, a Safety Management 
System, and an Emergency Plan. In addition, the directive mandates that EU member 
states control the siting of new facilities, modify existing establishments, and control 
the development of transport links, public places, and residential areas near the 
facilities. These Land Use Planning Policies aim to ensure that there is appropriate 
distance between hazardous operations and residential areas. 
 
Action item (7): Establish reporting requirements for data to assure compara-
bility of data across facilities and over time. 
 
Action item (8): Provide funding for the establishment and maintenance of an 
internet-based reporting system, open to all interested parties. 
c. Setting Fines and Fees Sufficient to Discourage Polluters 
Chinese environmental laws have routinely specified maximum penalties that can be 
levied for non-compliance. In general, these penalty caps are so low that they provide 
no deterrence to non-compliance. In other words, it generally pays to pollute rather 
than control emissions. For example, under China’s Law of Atmospheric Protection 
and Control, the maximum penalty is set at 200,000 rmb (see Lu, Dudek, Qin, Zhang, 
Lin, Yang & Wang: “China’s Environmental Enforcement Capacity”, Case Study). The 
penalty is not adjusted for the size of enterprise, nor the severity of the pollution 
excursion. For large scale industrial enterprises, both capital and operating costs for 
modern pollution control is significantly greater than 200,000 rmb. In fact, a common 
problem is that enterprises may have purchased and installed control equipment but 
chosen not to operate it so as to save money. The penalty caps must be set to be at 
least as great as the financial gain from non-compliance if there is any hope of getting 
business to comply with environmental laws and regulations. Arguably, China does 
have the potential to levy administrative penalties such as shutting down enterprises 
which impose a heavier financial burden on the individual violator than the penalty 
caps imply. However, shutting down polluting enterprises is a rarely used enforcement 
tool since such an extreme action puts the environmental authority in direct conflict 
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with local economic interests. Since enterprises are rational polluters they will take 
into account the very low probability of being shut down when evaluating the financial 
consequences of non-compliance and not take this enforcement option seriously. 
 
Action item (9): At a minimum, alter the current penalty caps to a daily limit for 
the duration of the violation rather than the current absolute limit. Greater 
precision in providing deterrence can be gained by estimating the financial gains 
from non-compliance through the use of models and setting the penalty on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
Experience has shown that reporting can not simply be voluntary; nor can it be 
assumed that companies will comply with reporting requirements unless there are 
strong incentives for them to do so. International experience suggests that to ensure 
accurate and regular reporting of emissions and hazardous substance uses it is 
important to hold companies and individuals that are responsible for significant 
discharges and accidents liable for costs of response and recovery. Liability 
provisions have provided powerful incentives for reducing risky behaviors and 
reducing the likelihood of future disasters.  
 
Action item (10): Establish stringent civil and criminal liability provisions for 
facilities that fail to comply with reporting requirements for hazardous sub-
stances and other environmental reporting requirements. 
 
Action item (11): Establish civil and criminal liability provisions for operators of 
facilities responsible for environmental accidents. 
 
Action item (12): Train judges and the procuracy in the basic information 
needed to establish culpability in environmental damage and compensation 
cases. Provide standard default methodologies for the calculation of the financial 
magnitude of such damages and compensation. 
d. Promoting Environmental Disaster Preparedness 
International experience has shown the importance of establishing National Contin-
gency Plans for responding to oil spills and toxic releases. It also highlights the 
importance of establishing a National Response Center with the mandate of receiving 
reports of toxic releases. The U.S. Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environ-
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mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) - or what is commonly 
referred to as Superfund legislation. CERCLA required reporting to the National 
Response Center releases of hazardous substances above certain threshold levels 
(“reportable quantities”).  
 
Action item (13): Require the establishment of provincial and county level 
emergency planning committees and provincial level emergency response 
commissions. 
 
Action item (14): Establish a Hazardous Substances Response Fund for clean 
up of emergency spills. This can be financed with a tax on companies using 
hazardous substances, which, in turn becomes an incentive to reduce their use. 
e. Creating Independent Hazardous Substances Safety Boards 
Independent regulatory and investigation boards are an important element of emer-
gency response. In an effort to prevent accidents and to investigate those that do 
occur, Japan, Europe, and the United States have all found it necessary to establish 
independent investigation committees. Regarding chemical safety, the US Congress 
authorized in 1990 a Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board that became 
operational in 1998. This independent, non-regulatory agency is charged with 
investigating the causes of chemical accidents. It investigates specific chemical ac-
cidents and general chemical accident hazards. Its purpose is to protect the workers, 
the public, and the environment. In addition, the board issues reports and can make 
recommendations to Congress for regulatory changes that would improve safety.  
 
While it may seem self-evident that accidents need to be reported to competent 
authorities, it is not uncommon for perpetrators of accidents to try to cover them up. 
There are countless episodes of industries and governments that have tried to hide 
accidents from the public, or to try to create the image that a problem is not as serious 
as some might argue. History shows, unfortunately, that efforts to cover-up accidents 
often results in an intensification of damages and public and even international 
condemnation.   
  
Action item (15): Require companies to report the presence of hazardous 
chemicals and establish emergency response plans and mechanisms with the 
requirement for timely reporting of any accident. 
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f. Promoting Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Environmental governance in corporations is no less critical to the effective reform of 
environmental management in China than for the society as a whole. The experience 
in most of the world is that companies directly control the vast bulk of environmental 
investments and expenditures and make most decisions directly affecting 
environmental quality. For example, in the US the private sector is estimated to 
account for more than 90% of all environmental expenditures. The Corporate Social 
Responsibility Movement (CSR) has taken root in China, but it has not significantly 
focused yet on the environmental dimension of corporate responsibility. This 
deficiency is important because a lack of effective internal corporate environmental 
governance contributes to a continuing lack of company priority for environmental 
performance. 
 
Action item (16): Encourage companies to install corporate social and environ-
mental reporting systems, and stimulate consumers to ask for strict social and 
environmental standards of the products they buy. 
3.3 Enhance Stakeholder and Citizen Participation 
The complexity and quantity of the environmental issues confronting all nations today 
has overwhelmed the capacity of even the strongest and best prepared of 
governments, working alone. Adequate response to these challenges requires that 
governments encourage and embrace open and transparent decision-making and 
implementation processes. Moreover, international experience confirms that multiple 
stakeholder and public involvement in environmental policy making and implementa-
tion processes can result in stronger regulations, strengthen understanding of policy 
goals, and increase the likelihood of successful environmental policy implementation. 
And the information base needed to engage the public and the wide variety of 
affected stakeholders in these processes is more often than not provided by 
non-governmental researchers and disseminated by press and electronic media that 
are neither governmentally controlled nor censured. 
The Chinese public is clearly becoming more aware of the causes and deeper costs 
of pollution, today demanding a greater voice, and taking direct action in thousands of 
cases of pollution and environmental degradation across the nation. As reported 
recently in the China Daily, “An overwhelming 97 percent of Chinese consumers care 
about the environment; and almost as many would boycott products made by 
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companies which are insensitive to pollution” (March 17, 2006). While this survey was 
drawn from the educated middle class, in four major urban cities in China, the 
widespread environmental protests experienced in recent years suggests that 
concern for the environment is widespread throughout the population. Furthermore, 
some recent research (Land Economics, May 2006) analyzing the hypothesis of the 
so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve indicates that rising incomes may not be the 
real underlying cause of reduced emissions, but that they may be due to rising 
environmental awareness. 
a. Clarifying the legal Status of Citizens and NGOs 
The Chinese government is responding and has become increasingly open to civil 
society participation in environmental decision making and implementation (Lehrack: 
“Environmental NGOs in China – Partners in Environmental Governance”, Occasional 
Paper). Since 1993 environmental non-governmental organizations have been 
operating in China. The China Council reports that over 1,000 non-governmental 
environmental organizations have been recognized by the state. And there are many 
thousands more operating informally (see Mol & Carter, 2006, 160). Still, while the 
Chinese government now recognizes the importance of these civil society groups, the 
TF believes that more can and should be done to support their active involvement in 
the environmental policy process. The new Administrative Procedures Law in China 
importantly contains provisions for public consultation in rule making. However, many 
in the public and NGO community are unaware of this opportunity. It will require a 
concerted effort by government to engage civil society in this process. 
First of all, there remain numerous legal and administrative barriers in China that limit 
the ability of groups to obtain non-profit status and to participate meaningfully in the 
creation of regulations, the identification of problems, and the monitoring of 
environmental problems and regulatory progress. Given the inherent resource 
limitations that confront NGOs in China, a more favorable taxation environment for 
benefactors and NGOs themselves should be established. NGOs should also be 
eligible to compete for public support grants and capacity building programs for 
environmental protection. 
b. Conducting Environmental Education and Advice 
The positive results of opening the society further to environmental NGOs has been 
experienced in Japan where, despite a long history of environmental activism by 
citizens, there were many obstacles preventing the full realization of the abilities of 
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non-governmental groups. In the past 15 years, the Japanese government has done 
much to improve the status of the environmental non-governmental community by 
simplifying procedures for obtaining non-profit status, creating incentives for 
individuals and corporations to contribute to NGOs by creating provisions for tax 
deductible contributions, and by establishing governmental financial support 
mechanisms for NGO activities. U.S. examples, moreover, suggest that providing 
NGOs with the “right of standing” in the courts to represent the interests of victims of 
pollution and natural resources can be one of the most effective means of furthering 
environmental protection goals. However, NGOs can play numerous positive roles in 
the system of environmental management. NGOs can pioneer new policy innovations 
through the creation of demonstration projects funded by private resources. NGOs 
have established public-private partnerships to leverage available resources to 
enhance environmental protection and resource quality. NGOs are effective in 
educating the public about environmental problems and needed public responses to 
solve them. NGOs can bring added expertise to the policy process augmenting the 
government’s scarce resources. 
c. Improving Public Access to Environmental Information 
There are many measures that China could pursue to strengthen the role and 
contributions of the public to environmental governance. These include streamlining 
the process of obtaining non-profit status and taking measures to enhance NGOs’ 
financial status. This could include creating tax incentives for individuals and 
corporations to donate to NGOs and providing them with preferential postal rates. 
Measures should also be taken to mitigate the psychological barriers limiting citizen 
and NGO participation. This can be done through governmental assurances that 
NGOs will be given a voice even when their perspectives differ from that of industries 
or government planners. Also importantly, the legal standing of citizens and NGOs in 
environmental disputes should be clarified and adjudication through the courts be 
encouraged. 
d. Enhancing NGO Capacity 
A major challenge of any government is enforcement of regulations once they are 
established. In the cases of many European countries, including Germany and the 
Netherlands, Japan, and the United States, environmental groups have become 
important watchdogs of governmental and business behavior. Groups like BUND, 
Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace International, NABU, the 
Natural Resource Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and Word Wildlife 
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Fund/Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) have been important educators of the public 
about the importance of environmental protection. They have also reacted in cases 
where the government failed to enforce a regulation or a company violated the law. 
They have brought many suits on behalf of victims and damaged natural areas to the 
courts for trial. 
 
The combination of environmental group activism and a powerful and independent 
judiciary have done much to give meaning to national legislation. It also helps to serve 
as a deterrent to companies that might otherwise violate the law. 
Action item (17): Simplify and make easier the process of obtaining non-profit 
status and take measures to enhance NGOs’ financial status.   
Action item (18): Provide tax incentives for individuals and corporations to 
donate to environmental NGOs.   
Action item (19): Mitigate the psychological barriers limiting citizen and NGO 
participation with governmental assurances that NGOs will be given a voice 
even when their perspectives differ from that of industries or government 
planners.   
Action item (20): Enhance the legal status of citizens and NGOs clarifying their 
rights in environmental controversies, providing them legal standing in the courts 
on behalf of injured social groups and the environment.   
Action item (21): Support public-private partnerships that develop environment- 
friendly enterprises, products, and processes. 
3.4 Establish Multi-Sector Coherence and Foresight and Improve International 
Environmental Cooperation 
a. Establishing Policy Coherence and Foresight Capacity 
After several decades building the capacity to better manage specific problems of air, 
water, soil, and toxic pollution and better manage the natural environment in general, 
the experience in virtually all OECD nations has been that strong regulation and 
enforcement, even when combined with clear legally mandated goals and objectives, 
may prove insufficient to counter or adequately modulate the imperatives of economic 
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growth in a society. This problem is compounded by the propensity of the differing 
ministries of government to pursue their mission unconscious or unaware of the 
particularly long-term impacts of their actions on the environment.  
There is no easy solution to the inherent conflict between economy and ecology, 
though several approaches have been and are being pursued. One of the most 
common approaches is to establish an advisory council to the state environmental 
minister, composed of environmental scientists, professionals, and stakeholders from 
affected sectors of industry and labor, NGOs, and the public to provide advice on 
policy directions and implementation strategies. In the U.S., this is represented by 
numerous advisory bodies to the state minister (Director of EPA) and at a higher 
governmental level, by the President’s Council of Environmental Quality. In Germany, 
the Council of Environmental Advisors (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen - SRU) 
and the Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Globale 
Umweltveränderungen - WBGU) were set up in 1971 and 1992, respectively, to 
provide independent expert advice from multiple disciplinary perspectives on the state 
and trends of the national and global environment, and policy recommendations to 
the German government. In addition, in 2001, a National Council on Sustainable 
Development (Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung - RNE) was established, consisting of 
a broad range of practitioners, representing various stakeholders. Japan too has 
developed a very elaborate and consultative process, with a series of Environmental 
Advisory Councils composed of critical stakeholders and tiering from the national 
down through the prefectural and municipal level of government. More recently, the 
Global Environmental Council of Japan was established, chaired by the Prime 
Minister, to advise the government not just on the traditional issues of environmental 
pollution and resource protection, but the challenges of global change (see Hirono: 
“The Environmental Advisory System in Japan,” Occasional Paper).   
In recognition of the need to better coordinate across ministries, all ministries should 
be required to have their own internal environmental department to provide 
consultation and advice for environmental issues and problems affecting each 
ministry’s mandate. In addition, various ministries within government have been 
encouraged to share their plans and data, meet with one another to reconcile 
differences, and leverage their scientific assessments and knowledge in developing 
national goals and objectives. The “planning cycle” process instituted by several 
OECD countries has taken this approach the furthest, including “explicit objectives 
and target-setting, evaluation of progress in achieving them, providing feedback to 
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policy makers and adjusting priorities on the basis of lessons learned” (OECD, op. cit., 
2006, Ch. 17, p. 16). Of these, the Netherlands provides the most comprehensive 
multi-sector national environmental policy planning process (NEPP 1 and 2). A crucial 
feature of the Dutch environmental policy planning is its organization along 
environmental themes (climate change, acidification, waste, etc.) and target groups 
(industry, agriculture, transport, consumers, etc.) rather than environmental media 
(water, air, soil, etc.) or individual pollutants. This enables an integrated, cross-media 
approach to sets of related problems and the development of coherent, cross-sector 
policies for groups of polluters. Ambitious long-term environmental goals and 
strategies are established in close co-operation between target groups and all 
ministries involved, which reduce uncertainty about future policies and enhance 
commitment to those policies (see Knill & Liefferink, 2006).   
Another approach is to require the review of all major developments for consistency 
with the goals of the various ministries affected – development, infrastructure, urban 
planning, environmental, agricultural, etc – prior to granting approval to proceed. This 
is the intent of the environmental impact reports required universally in OECD nations 
- and to a growing extent in China. The process of requiring developers and the 
communities in which they are located to consider the effects of major developments 
on the environment and natural resources has proven useful, especially in helping to 
avoid the most harmful unwanted impacts. However, these reports are typically only 
advisory and, in many instances, have become perfunctory. In others, they have been 
used by anti-development factions to impede development for their self-interest rather 
than to protect the environment. It is especially important to conduct post hoc reviews 
of the effectiveness of reviews. For example, the Environmental Impact Assessment 
conducted for firms prior to permitting often requires mitigating actions. To what 
extent have these compensating actions been implemented?  
A recent approach being taken by several nations is to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible the production of pollution and harmful environmental effects in the first 
instance, through anticipating and mitigating these in advance. This is being 
accomplished through using less energy per capita and per production unit, adoption 
of cleaner energy sources (see Bechberger & Reiche: “Good Governance for 
Renewable Energies - The Example of Germany”, Occasional Paper), eliminating if 
not greatly minimizing toxic and hazardous materials in product manufacture and 
agriculture, designing products for disassembly, requiring end-of-life take-back by 
manufactures, fostering ecological modernization modes of technology development 
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and production, practicing eco-friendly and water-saving agriculture, fostering green 
and “smart” urban planning, and adopting principles of harmonization and a circular 
economy. All are examples of policies that anticipate and avoid harm, albeit mostly on 
a pilot or limited base.  
All of these approaches require an uncharacteristic degree of openness and 
transparency within and among government agencies. In recognition of this fact, 
national governments have had to compel their ministries and leaders to be more 
forthcoming. This was one impetus behind the “freedom of information” laws and the 
toxic reporting inventory (TRI) system adopted in the US. Another was to provide 
citizens with environmental information as the key to effective public participation. In 
addition, these disclosure provisions required companies to make public estimates of 
emissions that they previously had not measured or reported. It also was one of the 
major motives behind the Directive on Freedom of Access to Environmental 
Information of the EU (see Liefferink: “New Modes of Environmental Governance – 
The Experience of the European Union”, Occasional Paper). 
None of these approaches has prevented all the harmful environmental effects of 
resource extraction and economic growth. However, institutional and policy 
experimentation has proceeded further toward this goal in Japan and the West, and 
this has resulted in a relatively better balance between economic growth and 
environmental protection.   
Where such progress has been made, moreover, it has occurred in large part when 
the top leadership of the nation has insisted that those responsible at the ministerial 
level and likewise at sub-national levels work together, in what have been new, 
forward planning inter-sectoral institutions within government. In some instances, this 
is taking place in open institutional forums, inviting comment and participation by the 
public, private, and non-governmental actors in society. It has worked most effectively 
where the nation’s political leaders have developed methods of information gathering, 
verification, and assessment that provide more representative feedback than any 
single ministry or source of assessment can be expected to provide.   
In view of the necessary steps remaining for China to achieve the level of balance 
being achieved elsewhere, and in consideration of its absolute size, commitment to 
an unprecedented pattern of economic development, and relatively modest capacity 
to address domestic and international environmental issues, the TF recommends 
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developing the institutional capacity for foresight and coordination at the ministerial 
and governmental levels. The body should be required to hear and make 
recommendations on inter-ministerial disputes over environmental responsibilities 
and practices. Participants should include the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Construction, Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Land and Resources, Ministry of Water Resources, 
China Meteorology Administration, State Forestry Administration, Ministry of Health, 
and, of course, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). 
While SEPA is responsible for developing and implementing environmental policies 
for the nation, it so far lacks the political standing and institutional forms for bringing 
together the relevant ministries, industrial sectors, and the public to carry out its 
mission (see Li & Zusman: “Institutional Capacity and Environmental Regulation in 
China”, Case Study).   
In addition to the above recommendation to elevate SEPA to cabinet level, the TF 
recommends that a cabinet level coordinating body be established to share and 
reconcile competing and conflicting national priorities, reporting its findings on a 
regular basis to the government, available to the public. This could be similar to the 
former Environmental Protection Commission of the State Council (cf. OECD, 2006, 
p.18). However, the most promising model for serving the interests of the government 
as a whole, and reconciling different interests and perspectives in society, and doing 
so at the very highest level, is provided in the example of the Japanese Global 
Environmental Council, with the Prime Minister as Chair, and all stakeholders and 
citizens having access to the deliberative and policy recommending process of the 
council. 
Action item (22): Establish a cabinet-level inter-ministerial body to share 
scientific analysis, performance data, and each ministry’s respective annual and 
multi-year strategic plans for achieving the environmental goals of the nation.   
Action item (23): Establish a high level multi-sector, multi-stakeholder, national 
council of experts, chaired by the Prime Minister, to assess compatibility and 
reconcile differences in goals and strategies of the various ministries and 
interests of society as they affect the environment, and to advise the President, 
the Premier, and the State Council on environmental policy.   
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b. Improving International Environmental Cooperation 
There is little question that China has become a major East Asian economic and 
political superpower and that it is rapidly moving towards global superpower status. 
The increasing interconnectivity between China, its neighbors, and the global 
community in commerce is quickly being matched by its connectivity and 
responsibility to reduce transboundary and global environmental problems, to ensure 
the protection of the environment and of natural resources beyond its boarders.   
 
The East Asian region still has few cooperative institutional forums for addressing 
transboundary pollution problems or international environmental crises although 
some steps have been taken in this direction with the formation of the Tripartite 
Environment Ministers meetings and various river basin commissions. As the largest 
polluter in the region, China should take the lead in proposing the establishment of an 
East Asian inter-governmental environmental commission to address transboundary 
pollution problems, emergencies, and the links between trade and the environment.   
 
While China has become involved in an increasingly large number of regional 
commissions, these are typically established as reactive, rather than preventative 
bodies. An East Asian Environmental Commission could be tasked with harmonizing 
data gathering and reporting procedures, dissemination of monitoring data, joint 
research into the causes and consequences of transboundary pollution matters, 
promotion of environmental and nuclear safety (including nuclear waste disposal), 
and addressing cases where regional trade and environmental concerns are in 
conflict. This could be done through existing mechanisms such as the Tripartite 
Environmental Ministers meeting or the ASEAN plus three groups, or through the 
creation of a new inter-governmental body. Most importantly, a more assertive and 
forward looking approach is needed.  
 
One possible model is the North American Commission on Environmental Coopera-
tion, which was set up to protect, conserve, and improve the environment through 
increased regional cooperation and public participation. Another model would be the 
European Environment Agency (EEA) in Copenhagen, which, however, is primarily a 
monitoring and data gathering center.   
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Action item (24): China should propose to other nations in the region the 
establishment of an East Asian Environmental Commission to promote a com-
prehensive regional approach to the protection, improvement, and sustainable 
management of its environment and natural resources.   
 
Action item (25): China should prepare for playing a more active role in the im-
plementation and further development of the United Nations environmental 
conventions and multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs), especially on 
climate, biodiversity, desertification, water, forests, and persistent organic pollut-
ants in order to insure mutually agreed goals are met and fortified.   
 
Action item (26): Special efforts should be made to enhance the effectiveness 
of China’s environmental diplomacy and participation in global environmental 
governance by strengthening the environmental training of China’s diplomatic 
corps. 
4. Conclusions 
China is at a cross road. Environmental expectations are rising among its citizens 
along with impatience at the persistence and magnitude of environmental insults and 
damages. World attention is focused on China as a result of its rapid economic growth 
and emergence on the global scene, as exemplified by the hosting of the Olympics in 
Beijing in 2008. Yet, increasingly the image of China is as the world’s factory with 
rampant pollution blanketing the landscape, urban areas clogged with cars, skies filled 
with the emissions from innumerable smokestacks, and rivers too polluted to sustain 
either life or productive use. While this is a caricature, it contains too many elements of 
contemporary reality to ignore.   
 
China has many good environmental laws on the books. Its environmental 
professionals are dedicated and serious about their charge. There has been 
considerable forward progress in managing environmental problems. However, the 
fundamental problem facing China is the mis-match of the speed of change driven by 
global market forces in the business sector and the relatively slow pace of institutional 
change to cope with the unwanted and damaging by-products of rapid economic 
growth. The work of this Task Force has focused on the key elements of environmental 
governance that can be improved in order to enhance China’s prospects for dealing 
with these growing environmental challenges.   
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Of special importance is the need for a coherent master plan for institutional reform in 
environmental governance. The Task Force has attempted to identify key elements of 
such a plan by focusing on changes in institutional arrangements and processes that - 
if adopted - could significantly enhance the effectiveness of China’s environmental 
governance. The members of the Task Force firmly believe that the goal of a Xiaokang 
society can only be attained if China’s population enjoys a high level of environmental 
quality.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Occasional Papers - Summaries and Recommendations 
 
Miranda A. SCHREURS 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE   
 
Executive Summary   
Environmental governance refers to the approaches used by a society to address 
pollution and promote conservation. Whereas the word “government,” focuses 
attention on governmental bodies and actors, the term “governance” addresses the 
processes used by governments to collaborate with private actors and non-profit 
organisations to control or coordinate social and economic activities, achieve societal 
goals and deal with policy issues.   
Approaches to environmental governance are changing - in Europe, Japan, and the 
United States. National governments began to become involved in environmental 
protection in the 1960s and 1970s. During this early period, environmental policy was 
characterized by command and control environmental regulations.  Regulations were 
typically technocratic in nature and focused on specific pollutants. While these 
regulations have played a critical role in improving environmental conditions, there is 
now growing awareness of the limitations of reliance, especially the exclusive reliance, 
on the command and control approach.   
As a result, new modes of environmental governance, characterized by 
multi-stakeholder participation and more transparent decision making are being 
adopted. Also, the focus of programs is shifting from dealing with pollution after it 
emerges to preventative and precautionary planning. There is greater interest in 
approaches that have as their goal the protection of human health and ecological 
systems rather than simply the reduction or elimination of a specific pollutant.   
China is at a critical juncture. The country’s pollution and natural resource degradation 
problems are severe. If China is to continue to sustain high economic growth rates 
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and improve the quality of life of its citizens, environmental conditions will have to 
improve. In order to meet these needs, China must strengthen its environmental 
governance.   
 
Author’s Recommendations   
China’s leaders have recognized the need to establish national environmental quality 
standards, health standards, technology standards, and nature protection programs 
and goals. Yet, effective implementation of environmental standards is often 
hampered by insufficient societal awareness, incomplete monitoring systems, uneven 
enforcement of regulations, and insufficient incorporation of environmental goals into 
economic planning, among other problems. As is the case with countries around the 
world, China needs to find ways to strengthen its environmental governance.   
 
Meeting environmental goals requires strengthening the capacity of national 
environmental administration. In many developed countries this was done by elevating 
the national environmental protection administration to full cabinet rank. Given the 
size and scale of China’s environmental challenges, strengthening the capacities and 
political authority of SEPA should be seriously considered.   
 
In the past, environmental regulations were too often designed to simply reduce or 
control a specific pollutant rather than to consider how best to protect ecological and 
health systems with more holistic, preventative, equitable, and cost-effective 
strategies. China could do much to limit future pollution by requiring greater attention 
to environmental matters in planning decisions. Relatedly, the Chinese government 
could save money and energy and win the good will of the people by adopting more 
environmental considerations into urban planning and industrial development. One of 
the best ways to achieve sustainable development is through the promotion of such 
concepts as green planning, smart growth, recycling or circular economies. A full 
range of environmental policy tools, ranging from regulations to environmental 
information disclosure to market-based mechanisms should be considered.   
 
Addressing environmental degradation requires cooperation among actors at all 
levels: local, regional, national, international and global; as well as among different 
stakeholders: governmental, corporate, non-governmental, and societal. Involving the 
public in environmental goal setting, solution design, monitoring and enforcement has 
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proven effective in assisting governments in establishing and implementing sound and 
achievable goals. This can be done by facilitating the formation and operations of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environmental programs with universities, 
and scientific communities.   
 
Environmental decision making, monitoring, and enforcement procedures should be 
transparent. Information about pollutant emissions, environmental quality, and 
environmental performance of organizations, industries, and regions should 
systematically be provided and regularly be reported.   
 
Ryokichi HIRONO  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 
 
Executive Summary 
Since the mid-1990s, the issue of environmental governance in the developing 
countries of Asia has attracted the attention of researchers as well as policy-makers. 
Environmental governance here is interpreted as a framework of values, norms, rules, 
policies and institutions, both formal and informal, that determine the individual and 
collective behaviour of different stakeholders in society and the interactions among 
them for environmental protection and conservation in a given place, whether local, 
national, corporate, regional or global.   
The author sets the agenda in this paper as follows:   
First, to look into the current environmental governance situation in Asia and provide 
some explanations for the continuing environmental degradation in this region. By 
doing so, it is hoped that decisions for better corporate, local, national, regional and 
global environmental governance would emerge in all countries.   
Second, to examine the critical factors responsible for the change in environmental 
policies from ‘command and control’ to a new set of regulatory and market-based 
measures now increasingly observed in Asian countries. Government efforts to 
reduce air and water pollution and to deal with pollution arising from increasing 
urbanization and the change of lifestyles, have failed miserably in the developing 
countries of Asia. Many stakeholders within and outside the Asian countries - 
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including intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations - have come to 
claim the lack of good governance as a major cause of continuing environmental 
degradation.   
Third, to provide strategies and policies for realizing good environmental governance 
in Asian countries and at the regional level, by closely examining what developed 
countries, particularly Japan, have done in this regard.   
 
Author’s Recommendations   
Improving environmental governance in the developing Asian countries should focus 
on the following points:  
- Expand and improve the network of institutions that review and disseminate 
information on the quality of the environment through various channels, 
including mass media and the Internet.   
 
- Undertake reviews of laws and regulations related to environmental 
management in both the public and private sector, with a view to removing 
inconsistencies among them, and further integrate environmental 
considerations into economic, social and other sectoral policies.   
 
- Promote decentralization of responsibility for environmental quality to local 
governments in environmental policy-making and implementation.   
 
- Expand membership and participation of environmental NGOs and affected 
local communities in the process of environmental governance.   
 
- Explore the possibilities for applying the concepts of Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) and Strategic Environmental Management (SEM). Give 
special consideration to bringing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) into 
compliance with environmental laws and regulations.   
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Duncan LIEFFERINK 
 
NEW MODES OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE – 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Executive Summary   
New modes of environmental governance were introduced in the European Union 
(EU) from the 1980s onwards for two main reasons:   
 
In order to improve decision-making: It was hoped that more open, flexible modes of 
governance would lead to easier and more rapid decision making;   
 
In order to improve implementation by the EU Member States: It was hoped that more 
open, flexible modes of governance would allow for better accommodation of 
geographical, socio-economic, legal and political differences within the EU.   
 
The paper elaborates on those two points in the form of two cases studies:   
 
The first case study deals with attempts in the 1990s to curb motor vehicle emissions 
through a negotiated agreement between the EU Commission and the car and oil 
industry, the so-called Auto-Oil I Programme. The experiment failed, mainly because 
the Member States were not prepared to give the necessary negotiation mandate to 
the Commission. The case illustrates that substantive stakeholder involvement tends 
to shift decision-making powers from the legislature to the executive. Without a strong 
political willingness, such shift is not likely to be accepted by the legislature.   
 
The second case study deals with the implementation of the EU Directive on Free 
Access to Environmental Information in three major Member States: the UK, France 
and Germany. It shows that new modes of environmental governance are not as such 
more easy to implement than traditional ‘command-and-control’ measures. Both types 
of policies may be fundamentally incompatible with existing institutional and 
administrative traditions. Such incompatibilities, moreover, turn out to be highly 
specific for each country.   
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Author’s Recommendations   
The main policy recommendations can be summarised as follows:   
- Develop concrete targets, direct regulation and clear incentives, which are both 
crucial and necessary for the effectiveness of new, more open and flexible 
modes of environmental governance.   
 
- When introducing new, more open and flexible modes of environmental 
governance (including new policy instruments), build on existing institutions 
and regulatory traditions in order to be successful.   
 
 
Daniel A. MAZMANIAN 
 
ACHIEVING AIR QUALITY –  
THE LOS ANGELES EXPERIENCE 
 
Executive Summary   
Los Angeles is a leading example of the importance of a metropolitan-based approach 
to emissions reduction being pursued in the United States today. Key political, 
economic, cultural, and technological factors have combined to bring about significant 
reduction in air pollution in the Los Angeles region.   
 
Playing an important role over the past 35 years have been the significant 
improvements in stationary and mobile air emissions control technology and business 
practices; the development of demanding clean air policy at the national, state, and 
regional level; and the creation of a strong regional administrative agency with the 
task of monitoring and implementing clean air policy. Little progress in cleaning the 
region’s air, however, would have occurred absent the unrelenting pressure by civil 
society to do so.   
 
The Los Angeles region remains under substantial pressure from national, state, and 
local policy, and from the public, to achieve even further air emission reduction, 
especially with respect to today’s prominent pollution ‘hot-spots’. The region’s 
population continues to grow and the economy to thrive and expand, with all this 
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implies for the generation of greater levels of emissions. Thus, despite the impressive 
accomplishments in reversing the trends in air emissions and in meeting clean air 
goals in the region, the struggle for better air quality is far from over.   
 
Author’s Recommendations   
The Los Angeles experience suggests three crucial factors in accounting for the 
appreciable success of environmental governance.   
 
Leadership: Dedicated political and administrative leadership is essential for 
formulating policy, supporting implementation, and rallying public support; leadership 
that reflects the values and channels the environmental expectations of the people 
and the community.   
 
Technology: Success depends heavily on having a technology strategy that fosters 
the use of both “off-the-shelf” and “yet-to-be-demonstrated” technologies to bring 
about air emission reductions.   
 
Multi-Sector Coordination: A successful environmental strategy requires attacking air 
pollution through aligning action in several major arenas: regional development, urban 
design, energy, and transportation.   
 
 
Mischa BECHBERGER & Danyel REICHE 
 
GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGIES – 
THE EXAMPLE OF GERMANY  
 
Executive Summary 
Germany’s pioneering role in the field of renewable energies can best be stated by its 
world leading position in installed wind power and photovoltaics. Also its first 
European rank in the production of biofuels and installed solar thermal collector space 
is remarkable. 
These successes are not due to an exceptionally good natural resource base; mainly 
they are the result of an innovative national support policy. Pressure from the 
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European and international commitments also have contributed to the German 
success story in renewable energies.   
The paper analyses the main factors of the German case in the development of 
renewable energies, including the design elements of the national promotion 
instruments and support programs, the policy impacts from the European and the 
international level, technical as well as cognitive conditions. In addition, a description 
is given of further driving forces for a successful renewable energy development in 
other European countries.   
The paper ends with a discussion on which of the described success factors of the 
German case of renewable energy development might be transferable to China - and 
which not.   
 
Authors’ Recommendations 
With its ambitious goals for the year 2020 of a 30 % renewable energies share in 
electricity consumption and a 15 % share in primary energy consumption, China has 
committed itself to a more sustainable energy policy.   
 
In February 2005, China adopted a renewable energies promotion act which 
resembles the successful German “Feed-in law” (Erneuerbare Energien-Gesetz - 
EEG). While this policy seemed to set the right incentives for a fulfilment of the goals 
set, the financing mechanism was based on a tendering scheme, which in other 
countries (like UK or Ireland) hasn’t shown good results. Therefore, China should 
better move towards a remuneration scheme with fixed, stable and long term tariffs for 
renewable energy power, like in the German EEG.   
 
For photovoltaics, with their still relatively high electricity generation costs, an 
additional programme with investment subsidies, like e.g. the German “100,000 Roofs 
PV Programme”, might be a useful complement to a stable tariff system.   
 
Furthermore, China should continue to quickly build up its renewable energy industry, 
as the global market for renewables keeps on growing fast. Moreover, with a commit-
ment to an active international climate policy, with binding reduction targets for CO2 
emissions in the second period of the “Kyoto Protocol” (after 2012), China could 
create a big national market for projects under the “Clean Development Mechanism” 
(CDM).   
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Finally, the institutions established to foster renewable energy development in China 
should be strengthened at the ministry level to give the promotion of renewables a 
stronger representation within the government.   
 
Ryokichi HIRONO 
 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISORY SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
 
Executive Summary 
In this paper the environmental advisory system installed at local and national levels in 
Japan is singled out as one of the important institutional mechanisms of effective 
environmental governance.   
The author sets the agenda as follows:  
First, to provide as background to the environmental advisory system many decades 
of painful experience of environmental degradation that Japan had undergone and 
environmental legislation that Japan had undertaken.   
Second, to identify major factors responsible for the change from the Advisory Council 
on Anti-Pollution Measures (ACAP) to the Central Environmental Advisory Council 
(CEAC), and the Cabinet-level Global Environmental Council (GEC), chaired by the 
Prime Minister - concomitant with the upgrading of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to the Ministry of Environment (MOE).   
Unlike ACAP, concerned mainly with anti-pollution policy and compensation to the 
environmentally disadvantaged, such as Minamata methyl-mercury pollution, Itai-Itai 
limb and joint paralysis, Yokkaichi respiratory disease, and Niigata Minamata, CEAC 
and GEC have been increasingly involved in a large spectrum of environmental 
conservation, pollution prevention and disaster management, respectively, at the local, 
national, and at the global level.   
And third, to suggest ways and means of how to make advisory systems an integral 
part of environmental governance in Asian countries in the future.   
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Author’s Recommendations   
Japan’s environmental advisory system has evolved over time and assisted local and 
central governments in directing environmental policy agendas in a timely fashion.   
 
Based on the findings and recommendations of the advisory system, continuous mass 
media reporting has facilitated the public to have greater environmental awareness, 
understand better the adverse implications of environmental degradation to human 
health and ecosystems as well as to future generations.   
 
The advisory system has helped industry to better understand the need for and the 
importance of developing environmental technology and corporate environmental 
management.   
 
The advisory system has also been a critical agenda setter for experts engaged in 
environmental research and laboratory work.   
 
Finally, the environmental advisory system has provided the academic community 
with ample data and methodology on which to base their on-going and future studies. 
 
 
Dorit LEHRACK 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN CHINA – 
PARTNERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Executive Summary   
This paper is a snapshot of the potential of Chinese environmental NGOs to effectively 
address environmental problems, alone and in partnership with others. As 
environmental NGOs have only been on stage for the last ten years or so and as they 
undergo dynamic changes, a thoroughly conducted scientific analysis about the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks seems not possible yet. However, 
some empiric findings can be given, and some trends and tendencies be predicted.   
 
The paper starts with at look at the history of NGOs in China, with a specific focus on 
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environmental NGOs, followed by problems and chances caused by the present legal 
status of the groups. It describes the main working areas of Chinese environmental 
NGOs, as illustrated by some representative examples.   
 
The main trend is that Chinese NGOs, irrespective of their origin (grass root, 
semi-state organizations or Government-organized non-profit environmental 
organizations) will gain more respect and influence in both environmental awareness 
raising and as a competent partner in policy formulation and law enforcement. To do 
so, however, the State institutions concerned will have to let them participate in 
environmental planning and developing processes at an early stage and assist them 
in their capacity building.   
 
Author’s Recommendations 
To establish environmental NGOs as equal partners in promoting environmental 
governance in China, it is recommended that,  
 
- the role and function of NGOs be specified in the process of improving 
environmental governance;   
 
- meetings be organized, inviting experienced local and national NGOs and 
representatives of international NGOs in order to discuss the topic and details 
of modern environmental governance and to build trust and relationship;   
 
- funding be provided for NGO training with the objective of establishing a 
network of skilled experts on environmental governance across the country;   
 
- a website be developed with good practice examples, that can be replicated 
elsewhere in China;   
 
- NGOs be commissioned to conduct training for journalists on the topic of 
environmental governance;   
 
- an annual award be given for best practical cooperation of local environmental 
bureaus and local/international NGOs.   
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Mary A. GADE & Cynthia A. FAUR 
 
THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SYSTEM – 
AN EVOLUTION IN FEDERAL VS. LOCAL CONTROL 
 
Executive Summary   
Prior to 1970, environmental regulation in the United States of America was primarily 
a local concern. While there were federal environmental regulations and laws, 
enforcement authority for those regulations and laws was spread through different 
departments of federal government.   
 
This changed some 35 years ago, when the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") was born. Its mission was to protect human health and the 
environment. During these past years, the United States system of environmental 
protection has undergone dramatic changes and has achieved significant 
environmental improvements.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the structure and functioning of US 
environmental governance from the creation of the EPA forward, and to evaluate the 
strengths and weaknesses of the system as it has evolved since then.   
 
Authors’ Recommendations   
The following are some recommendations about what to include and what to avoid in 
environmental governance for the 21st century.   
 
Elements to Avoid: 
• Regulatory schemes that treat large and small pollution sources alike.   
• Complete reliance on technology-forcing requirements.   
• Failing to adequately fund federal and regional environmental agencies.   
• Stifling workplace innovation and international marketplace incentives to 
prevent or reduce pollution.   
 
Elements to Include: 
• A strong federal-regional partnership with clear roles and responsibilities for 
environmental regulation and protection.   
 69
• Credible federal and regional enforcement programs to ensure a minimum level 
of environmental protection throughout the country.   
• Technology-forcing requirements to set minimum initial expectations, especially 
for large industries.   
• Market-based pollutants trading and environmental recognition programs, 
backed up by enforceable record-keeping and reporting requirements.   
• Information technology to simplify and automate record-keeping and reporting 
requirements.   
A country that learns from the experiences of the United States (and other nations) will 
gain many advantages in establishing or reorganizing its environmental governance 
system. Of course, such a system needs to address the unique cultural norms, 
political realities and environmental needs of the nation.   
 
 
Robert PERCIVAL & Miranda A. SCHREURS 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT – 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Executive Summary 
The paper reviews several examples of environmental crises in the United States, 
Europe and Japan and the changes in regulatory policy that they spawned. Based on 
that review, the authors conclude that environmental crisis management should 
consider the following major points:   
- Emergency preparedness requires that national and local authorities be aware 
of potential environmental hazards through careful monitoring of hazardous 
chemicals used by industry; their fate and transport, and their likely 
environmental impacts. Those who engage in activities that pose 
environmental risks should be required to demonstrate that they have 
developed comprehensive and effective emergency response plans.   
- Those responsible for releases of hazardous substances should be held liable 
for the full cost of remediating damage to the environment and human health. 
The establishment of effective liability schemes increases incentives for 
investments in measures to prevent environmental crises.   
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- When environmental crises do arise, it is essential that information concerning 
their nature and scope be disclosed promptly to emergency response 
authorities and the general public. Prompt reporting enhances the ability of 
response authorities to contain damage while maintaining public trust. 
- To prevent future environmental crises it is essential to learn from past 
experiences. Independent investigative bodies should explore the causes of 
environmental accidents and recommend measures to prevent their future 
occurrence.   
- Governments and industry have a responsibility to take measures to protect 
citizens from potential harm, to guarantee low-risk physical structures, to react 
in such a way as to minimize damages when accidents do occur, and to provide 
due compensation where damage to health and the environment does occur.   
 
Authors’ Recommendations   
In the United States, Japan and Europe, environmental crises have been catalysts for 
legislative and institutional change – and the basis for many lessons learned:  
- The high costs of delaying responses to hazardous substance release and 
failing to inform publics of environmental crises;   
- the need for rapid and appropriate responses to accidents and the 
establishment of independent investigation boards;   
- the importance of information disclosure, liability clauses, and establishing 
compensation mechanisms;   
- the need to pursue preventative and not just reactive policy measures;   
- the need to establish a norm of protection and prevention for governments and 
industry.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Case Studies – Abstracts 
 
LU Xin-yuan, Daniel J. Dudek, QIN Hu, ZHANG Jian-yu, LIN Hong,  
YANG Zi-jiang & WANG Yu-hong 
 
CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY 
 
Abstract 
The administrative enforcement of environmental laws plays an increasingly important 
role in environmental management in China. Many efforts have been made, one of 
which is the establishment of five regional enforcement centers throughout the country, 
in addition to the existing 4-level nation-wide environmental enforcement system. For 
this case study, a survey of 85 local enforcement institutions at three levels (provincial, 
city, and county) and 162 enterprises was conducted on: staffing, financial resources, 
equipment and technical support, instruments, enforcement outcomes, resistance, 
public involvement and economic incentives. From this survey it is concluded that 
progress has been made in overall environmental enforcement in China, that more 
attention has been given to local enforcement, and that improvement has been made 
in local environmental enforcement capacity. However, much more needs to be done 
on the issues of legal status, institutional arrangement, governance system, available 
resources, and the overall importance given to environmental enforcement.   
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YANG Zhan-li & GE Yong-de 
 
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE – 
A CASE STUDY ON NANTONG CITY 
 
Abstract 
Environmental governance is critically important to ensure the protection of the natural 
environment. Focusing on the city of Nantong, this paper identifies a series of local 
environmental governance problems, including the incompatibility of laws and 
regulations, unfavorable conditions for enforcement, low penalty cost associated with 
high compliance cost, and inadequate capacity building. Recommendations are made 
for the following aspects: further improvement in environmental laws and regulations; 
establishment of environmental responsibility in all departments of the local 
government; the increase of penalty cost to strengthen environmental compliance; 
and the improvement of local environmental capacity in general.   
 
 
LI Wan-xin & Eric ZUSMAN 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA 
 
Abstract 
A growing body of research attributes China’s environmental problems to weak 
regulatory enforcement. Few studies, however, have explored the relationship 
between institutional capacity and regulatory enforcement.  In this paper, the authors 
draw upon the literature on state capacity and institutional analysis to fill this void. The 
results reveal that local environmental protection bureaus with greater human 
capital—though not necessarily greater financial resources—enforce regulations more 
rigorously. However, these efforts do not necessarily lead to cleaner air or water. 
Regions with industries that have a greater capacity to abate pollution tend to pollute 
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more, offsetting the potentially beneficial effects of stronger regulatory enforcement. 
The authors conclude that it may take more than just innovative regulations to 
translate regulatory promise into real environmental progress.   
 
 
HU Tao, ZHANG Ling-yun, ZHANG Jian-yu & QIN Hu 
 
URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis on sustainable urbanization from the perspective of 
environmental governance. The authors identify the deficiencies existing in urban 
environmental governance, including insufficiency of environmental problem 
identification, confusion on duties among different levels and sectors, lack of scientific 
prove and coordination in urban policy making, and low efficiency in policy 
implementation and supervision. Suggestions are made on clarifying responsibilities, 
on improving the urban environmental policy making mechanism, and on 
strengthening supervision capacity for the promotion of sustainable urbanization.   
 
 
HU Tao, WU Yu-ping & ZHANG Ling-yun  
 
ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT 
 
Abstract 
With the rapid economic growth in China, the generation of solid wastes has 
expanded dramatically, threatening the economy, society, and the environment. This 
paper presents a problem analysis on four kinds of solid wastes: municipal solid 
wastes, industrial solid wastes, hazardous wastes, and imported solid wastes. The 
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authors identify three major problems confronting waste management in China.  
Firstly, unclear responsibility is the most urgent problem to be solved both in the 
management of municipal solid wastes and industrial wastes. Secondly, the lack of a 
well established legal system and efficient supervision mechanism is the biggest 
difficulty in the management of hazardous wastes. Thirdly, forbidding electronic waste 
trade is the focus in the management of imported solid wastes. Based on the 
problems identified, recommendations are made on how to improve the institutional 
basis of solid wastes management in China.   
 
 
YANG Zhan-li 
 
HOW TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
 
Abstract 
This paper puts forward a framework of environmental governance in China on the 
basis of theoretical analysis and discussion. Environmental governance consists of 
five fundamental elements, i. e., policy making, enforcement, management, 
emergency response, and environment technology. Each of these five elements is 
designated with specific criteria and ways to improve them from a legal, structural, 
administrative and governance perspective.   
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Daniel J. Dudek, QIN Hu & ZHANG Jian-yu 
 
SO2 CONTROL AND EMISSIONS TRADING IN CHINA 
 
Abstract 
With more than 20 years’ efforts, China has formulated a variety of policies to control 
SO2 emissions, involving regulations, standards, technologies, economic tools as well 
as administrative measures. Based on the depiction of the evolution of SO2 control 
policies, especially focusing on the pilot policy of emissions trading in China, the 
authors identify the problems facing environmental protection and diagnose the 
causes from the policy process as well as from an environmental governance 
perspective. The problems discussed include poor implementation, inadequate 
coordination, and inconsistency between policies. Some problems lie in the 
institutional arrangements between central and local governments, inter-ministerial 
coordination, and inter-departmental coordination within SEPA. For the sake of 
maximum feasibility, recommendations are made mostly from SEPA’s internal 
capacity building on the issues of policy making, coordinating, and monitoring, as well 
as on inspection and enforcement.   
 
 
QI Ye, SU Yang & CHEN Jing-hua 
 
CHINA’S BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
 
Abstract 
In this paper the major policies, laws, and institutions are described on policy-making 
and management for biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity conservation is regarded 
as a targeted regulation of human activities in order to maintain and restore the 
richness of life; the goal thus is to achieve a harmonious relationship between man 
and nature. The paper identifies the changes facing biodiversity conservation in China, 
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points out the ever-increasing population pressure and economic activities as main 
sources of threat. The authors focus on such governance issues as multi-level 
jurisdiction, inter-agency coordination, property rights, and financing. They conclude 
that an unclear division of responsibility and duties, as well as an unreasonable 
allocation of resources among multiple agencies mandated for biodiversity 
conservation are the major problems in the institutional setting, that lead nature 
reserves to exploit rather than conserve their resource, and that a lack of 
management capacity hinders the conservation function of these nature reserves. 
Policy recommendations are made to address the major governance problems.   
 
 
HU Tao, ZHANG Ling-yun & SUN Bing-yan 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF SANDSTORMS IN CHINA 
 
Abstract 
Based on a field survey in XilinGol Prefecture and Hunshandake sand land in Inner 
Mongolia, this paper presents an analysis on the governance causes of the sandstorm 
problem in China. The results indicate that governance issues are actually at the roots 
of the generation and inefficient control of sandstorms. Especially, 
“self-sufficiency”-targeted agricultural policies and common property of grasslands 
lead to the inducement of grassland degradation. Improper responsibility assignments, 
improper ecological restoration investment, absence of grassland restoration 
management and inefficiency of supervision are major restrictions for an efficient 
control of sandstorms in China. To solve these problems, the authors suggest: First, 
we should coordinate targets of current agricultural policy and environmental policy in 
order to reduce resources demand and prevent sandstorms from its sources. Second, 
we should enhance governance capacity in sandstorm control, focusing on clarifying 
the duties and strengthening the human resources for environmental protection in 
rural areas.   
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QI Ye & MA Li 
 
TOWARDS A PROACTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 
 
Abstract 
Climate change is treated in China as an issue related closely to the national strategy 
for sustainable development as well as an issue in international collaboration on envi-
ronmental protection. The duality of the issue makes climate policy often wavering 
between domestic and international emphases. In the past one and half decades, the 
central government responded to international pressure by participating in the nego-
tiations on international treaties, especially the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Taking a more proactive attitude towards mitigation of 
and adaptation to climate change, are the major approaches now. This paper de-
scribes the current governance structure for climate change management in China 
and makes concrete recommendations for its improvement. The major recommenda-
tion of the authors is to elevate the current National Group for Coordination of Climate 
Change Strategies and to empower it with authority for climate policy making and for 
monitoring the regional and sectoral impacts of climate change.   
 
 
HU Tao, LI Li-ping, ZHANG Ling-yun & TIAN Chun-xiu 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE YUANMINGYUAN PARK PROJECT 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of the Yuanmingyuan Park Leak-proof Project from 
the perspective of environmental governance. The study finds that an ambiguous 
assignment of implementation responsibilities, the lacking of policy coordination, 
inadequate policy implementation, and inefficient supervision have all contributed to 
the inevitability of the incidence described in this paper.   
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MAO Shou-long, LI Wen-zhao & LI Mei 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE SONGHUAJIANG CRISIS 
 
Abstract 
In the process of industrialization, the relation between economic growth and 
environmental protection has become a key problem for China. In this respect, the 
Songhua river accident gives a serious warning: no environmental governance, no 
development. In this study of the accident, three major aspects of environmental 
governance are addressed: information disclosure and public participation, 
central-local and local-local relationships, and emergency responses. The first part of 
the study is a description of the situation of the Songhua river, including the process of 
the crisis. The second part looks at the actors and their behavior, including firms, 
citizens, interest groups, local governments, and the central government. The third 
part focuses on the relevant laws, regulations, and documents. The fourth part 
presents two research approaches: public choice theory and institutional analysis. In 
the fifth part, these approaches are used to identify the major causes of the Songhua 
river accident. Finally, some policy recommendations are presented. 
 
